artifice that the objective can be divorced from the subjective. Matter _is_ for us the Felt; its Qualities are differences of Feeling. 6. Not that this result is to be interpreted as freeing our Theoretic Conception from its objective side, and landing us in Idealism, which suppresses the real universe. The denial of all reality apart from our minds, is a twofold mistake: it confounds the conception of general relations with particular relations, declaring that because the External in its relation to the sentient organism can only be what it is felt to be, therefore it can have no _other_ relations to other individual reals. This is the first mistake. The second is the disregard of the constant presence of the objective real in every fact of Feeling: the Not-Self is emphatically present in every consciousness of Self. The legitimate conclusion is neither that of Dualism nor of Idealism, but what I have named Reasoned Realism (_Problems_, Vol. I. p. 201), which reconciles Common Sense with Speculative Logic, by showing that although the _truth_ of things (their _Wahrheit_) is just what we perceive in them (our _Wahrnehmung_), yet their _reality_ is this, and much more than this. _Things_ are what they are felt to be; and what they are thought to be, when thoughts are symbols of the perceptions. Idealism declares that they are _nothing but_ this. It is against this _nothing but_ that Common Sense protests; and the protest is justified by Reasoned Realism, which, taking a comprehensive survey of the facts, thus answers the idealist: “Your synthesis is imperfect, since it does not include _all_ the data--notably it excludes the fact of an objective or Not-Self element in every feeling. You may, conceivably, regard the whole universe as nothing but a series of changes in your consciousness; but you cannot hope to convince me that I myself am simply a change in yourself, or that my body is only a fleeting image in your mind. Hence although I conclude that the Not-Self is to you, as to me, undivorceable from Self, inalienable from Feeling, in so far as it is felt, yet there must nevertheless be for both of us an existence not wholly coextensive with our own. _My_ world may be my picture of it; _your_ world may be your picture of it; but there is something common to both which is more than either--an existent which has different relations to each. _You_ are not _me_, nor is the pictured Cosmos _me_, although I picture it. Looking at you and it, I see a vast whole of which you are a small part; and such a part I conclude myself to be. It is at once a picture and the pictured; at once subjective and objective. To me all your modes of existence are objective aspects, which, drawing from my own experience, I believe to have corresponding subjective aspects; so that your emotions, which to me are purely physical facts, are to you purely mental facts. And psychological analysis assures me that all _physical facts are mental facts expressed