27. The second question proposed was, In what sense can Feeling be correctly spoken of as an Agent in organic processes? This brings us face to face with a much-debated topic, the relation of Body and Mind; and demands a theoretic interpretation of that First Notion which expresses universal experience, namely, that what I know as Myself is a Body, in one aspect, and a Soul, in the other. What I call my Body is a persistent aggregate of objective phenomena; and my Soul is a persistent aggregate of subjective phenomena: the one is an individualized group of experiences expressible in terms of Matter and Motion, and therefore designated _physical_; the other an individualized group of experiences expressible in terms of Feeling, and therefore designated _psychical_. But, however contrasted, they are both simply embodiments of Experience, that is to say, are Modes of Feeling. All Existence--as known to us--is the Felt. The laws of our organism compel us, indeed, to postulate an Existent which is _extra mentem_--a Real not Ourselves--but the same laws debar us from any knowledge whatever of what this _is_, or is _like_. We know Things absolutely _in so far_ as they exist in relation to us; and that is the only knowledge which can have any possible significance for us. 28. It is impossible for me to doubt that I am a Body, though I may doubt whether what is thus called is anything more than a group of feelings. It is impossible for me to doubt that I am a Soul; though I may doubt whether what is thus called is more than a group of bodily functions. In separating what is unquestionable from what is questionable, we separate the fundamental facts of consciousness from the theoretic interpretations of those facts: no theoretic interpretation can efface or alter the facts. Whatever Philosophy may discover, it cannot displace the fact that I know I am a Soul, _in every sense in which that phrase represents Experience_: I know the Soul in knowing its concretes (feelings), and in knowing it as an abstraction which condenses those concretes in a symbol. The secondary question is, Whether this abstraction represents one Existent, and the abstraction Body another and wholly different Existent, or the two abstractions represent only two different Aspects? this may be debated, and must be answered according to theoretic probabilities.