The Physical Basis of Mind: Being the Second Series of Problems of Life and Mind.Lewes, George Henry
Philosophy
The Physical Basis of Mind: Being the Second Series of Problems of Life and Mind.
Lewes, George Henry
Mind and body; Psychophysiology
40. We are told that it is “impossible to imagine Matter thinking,”
which is very true; only by a gross _confusion_ of terms can Thought
be called a property of cerebral tissue, or of Matter at all. We
may, indeed, penetrate beneath the terms which relate to aspects,
and recognize in the underlying reality not two existences, but one.
Our conceptions of this reality, however, are expressed in symbols
representing different classes of feelings, objective and subjective;
and to employ the terms of one class to designate the conceptions of
the other is to frustrate the very purposes of language. Matter and
Mind, Object and Subject, are abstractions from sentient experiences.
We know them as abstractions, and know the concrete experiences from
which they are abstracted. Philosophers, indeed, repeatedly assure us
that we neither know what Matter is nor what Mind is, we only know the
_phenomenal products_ of the action and reaction of these two unknown
noumena. Were this so, all discussion would be idle; we could not say
whether Matter was or was not capable of thinking, whether Mind was or
was not the same as Matter, we could only abstain from saying anything
whatever on the topic. What should we reply to one who asked us to
name the product of two unknown quantities? So long as _x_ and _y_ are
without values their product must be without value. If the value of
_x_ be known, and that of _y_ unknown, then the product still remains
unknown: _x_ + _y_ = _x_ + 0 = _x_. Therefore, unless the Objective
aspect were the _equivalent_ of the Subjective aspect, it could never
be subjectively present. Feeling is but another aspect of the Felt.
41. It is because we do know what Matter is, that we know it is
_not_ Mind: they are symbols of two different modes of Feeling. If
we separate the conception of citizenship from the conception of
fatherhood, although the same man is both citizen and father, how much
more decisively must we separate the conception of Matter, which
represents one group of feelings, from the conception of Mind, which
represents another? One element in the former is common to the whole
group, namely, the reference to a Not-Self, induced by the sensation of
Resistance, which always ideally or sensibly accompanies the material
class. The axiom, I feel, _ergo_ I exist, has its correlative:--I act,
_ergo_ there are other existents on which I act; and these are not
wholly Me, for they resist, oppose, exclude me; yet they are also one
with Me, since they are felt by me. In my Feeling, that which is not Me
is Matter, the objective aspect of the Felt, as Mind is the subjective
aspect.
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