The Physical Basis of Mind: Being the Second Series of Problems of Life and Mind.Lewes, George Henry
Philosophy
The Physical Basis of Mind: Being the Second Series of Problems of Life and Mind.
Lewes, George Henry
Mind and body; Psychophysiology
71. If the preceding attempt to disengage the question from the
ambiguities of its terms has been successful, we shall find little
difficulty in rationally interpreting all the facts adduced in favor
of Animal Automatism, without having recourse to a mechanical theory
of biological phenomena. The objections to that theory are that it
employs terms which have very misleading _connotations_ even when they
do not _denote_ phenomena of widely different orders; so that the moral
repugnance commonly felt at the attempt to treat the animal organism as
if it were a machine, is sustained by the intellectual repugnance at
the attempt to explain biological phenomena on principles derived from
phenomena of a simpler order.
Remark, in passing, this piquant contradiction: the Automaton theory
of Descartes, when applied to the animals, generally excited ridicule
or repulsion; whereas the far more inconsistent and mechanical
theory of Reflex Action has been almost universally welcomed as a
great discovery, though it banishes the Sensibility which Descartes
preserved. And further, the philosophers who most loudly protested
against the idea that animals were machines, were the philosophers
who most insisted that these animals were made, not evolved--planned
by their maker, as a watch is planned by its maker, with a distinct
purpose and prevision in the disposition of every part; whereas the
philosophers who most emphatically reject this notion of organisms
being made, are often those who liken organisms to machines.
72. The paradox propounded by Descartes loses much of its strangeness
when we understand his meaning. Its terms are infelicitous because of
their misleading connotations. When he says that all the actions of
animals which seem to be due to Consciousness are in fact produced on
the same principles as those of a machine, he means that animals have
not souls to direct their actions; but since, on being questioned, he
is ready to admit that animals have sensation, perception, emotion, and
memory, his denial of their souls practically comes to much the same as
the ordinary position that animals have not Thought nor Consciousness
of Self.[220] The admission of sensation is, however, quite enough to
mark the essential difference between an organism and a machine.
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