The Physical Basis of Mind: Being the Second Series of Problems of Life and Mind.Lewes, George Henry
Philosophy
The Physical Basis of Mind: Being the Second Series of Problems of Life and Mind.
Lewes, George Henry
Mind and body; Psychophysiology
94. Mr. Spencer, as I have already suggested, seems to have been
led into his view by not keeping distinctly present to his mind the
differences between Properties of tissue and Function, the activity
of an organ. “That function takes precedence of structure,” he says,
“seems implied in the definition of Life. If Life consist of inner
actions so adjusted as to balance outer actions--if the actions are
the _substance_ of Life, while the adjustment constitutes its _form_;
then may we not say that the actions formed must come before that which
forms them--that the continuous change which is the basis of function
must come before the structure which brings the function into shape?”
The separation of “actions formed” from “that which forms them” is
inadmissible. An action cannot come _before_ the agent: it is the
agent in act. The continuous change, which is the basis of Vitality,
is a change of molecular arrangements; and the organ which gives a
special _direction_ to the vital activity, e. g. which shapes the
property of Contractility into the function of Prehension, this organ
must itself be formed before it can manifest this function. It is true
that in one sense the organs are formed by, or are differentiated in,
a pre-existent organism; true that the general activity of living
substance must precede the special activity of any organ, as the
expansions of steam must precede any steam-engine action; but the
general activity depends on the general structure; and the special
actions on the special structures. If by Organization we are to
understand not simply organized substance, but a more or less complex
arrangement of that substance into separate organs, the question is
tantamount to asking whether the simplest animals and plants have life?
And to ask the question, whether Life precedes organic substance? is
tantamount to asking whether the convex aspect of a curve precedes
the concave! or whether the motions of a body precede the body! To
disengage ourselves from the complicated suggestions of such a word as
Life, let us consider one of the vital phenomena, Contraction. This
is a phenomenon manifested by simple protoplasm, and by the highly
differentiated form of protoplasm known as muscle. In one sense it
would be correct to say that Contractility as a general property of
tissue precedes Contraction, which is specialized in muscle. But
it would be absurd to say that _muscular_ contraction preceded the
existence of muscle, and formed it. The contractions of the protoplasm
are not the same as muscular contractions any more than the hand of
a baby is the same as a man’s; the general property which both have
in common depends on the substance both have in common; the special
property which belongs to the muscle depends on its special structure.
An infinite activity of the contractile protoplasm would be incompetent
to form a muscle, unless it were accompanied by that peculiar change in
structure which constitutes muscle.
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