The Physical Basis of Mind: Being the Second Series of Problems of Life and Mind.Lewes, George Henry
Philosophy
The Physical Basis of Mind: Being the Second Series of Problems of Life and Mind.
Lewes, George Henry
Mind and body; Psychophysiology
Such reminiscences of earlier forms are intelligible on the supposition
that originally the later form was a modification of the earlier form,
and that this modification is repeated; or on the supposition that
there was a similarity in the organic conditions, which similarity
ceased at the point where the new form emerged. But on no hypothesis
of creative Plan are they intelligible. They are useless structures,
failing even to subserve a temporary purpose. Sometimes, as Mr. Darwin
remarks, a trace of the embryonic resemblance lasts till a late age:
“Thus birds of the same genus, and of closely allied genera, often
resemble each other in their first and second plumage: as we see in
the spotted feathers in the thrush group. In the cat tribe most of the
species are striped and spotted in lines; and stripes or spots can
plainly be distinguished in the whelp of the lion and the puma. We
occasionally, though rarely, see something of this kind in plants....
The points of structure in which the embryos of widely different
animals of the same class resemble each other often have no direct
relation to their conditions of existence. We cannot, for instance,
suppose that in the embryos of the vertebrata the peculiar loop-like
courses of the arteries near the bronchial slits are related to similar
conditions in the young mammal which is nourished in the womb of its
mother, in the egg of a bird which is hatched in a nest, and in the
spawn of a frog under water.”
104. It would be easy to multiply examples, but I will content myself
with three. The tadpole of the Salamander has gills, and passes his
existence in the water; but the _Salamandra atra_, which lives high
up among the mountains, brings forth its young full-formed. This
animal never lives in the water. Yet if we open a gravid female, we
find tadpoles inside her with exquisitely feathered gills, and (as I
have witnessed) these tadpoles “when from the mother’s womb untimely
ripped,” if placed in water, swim about like the tadpoles of water
newts. Obviously this aquatic organization has no reference to the
future life of the animal, nor has it any adaptation to its embryonic
condition; it has solely reference to ancestral forms, it repeats a
phase in the development of its progenitors. Again, in the embryo of
the naked Nudibranch, we always observe a shell, although the animal
is without a shell, and there can be no purpose served by the shell in
embryonic life.[47] Finally, the human embryo has a tail, which is of
course utterly purposeless, and which, although to be explained as a
result of organic laws, is on the creative hypothesis only explained as
an adherence to the general plan of structure--a specimen of pedantic
trifling “worthy of no intellect above the pongo’s.”[48]
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