In pursuance of the importance of the resolves of the Council Chamber of this African state, I reverted to the circumstances of the last war, and the great struggle of England and France, of which another African state, at the other extremity of the Mediterranean, had been the first cause and the original field; and the question naturally arose, “Was it possible that Napoleon,--who, after an attempt on, and a failure in Egypt, planned the conquest of Spain,--should have neglected a country identified with the language, manners, and institutions of the one, and available for the injury or the protection of the other?” The opinion of Lord Nelson as to the importance to England of the friendship of the Moor, proves that Morocco was a piece in the great European game, and one which even his antagonists understood. But Napoleon’s moves were beyond their reach. His game was lost by his own faults; their merit (I speak not of mere battles, or even of campaigns) consisted only in turning to account the incidents of his fortunes. The siege of Gibraltar was promised by him to the Spaniards, when the French troops crossed the Pyrenees; and such a measure would have powerfully contributed to the success of his project. Gibraltar, in that case, would have been the point of the operations of the war. But this course could scarcely be taken without some chance of success, and that depended entirely on the dispositions of Morocco. Napoleon having foregone all the political advantages to be secured by this siege, it may not be too much to assume, that he made the mistake in respect to Morocco which he did in respect to Spain, and perceived that the Moors were beyond his power to secure, or his reach to coerce. At St. Helena he recognised the identity of the position, and the similarity of character of the two people.