The Place of Science in Modern Civilisation, and Other EssaysVeblen, Thorstein
Philosophy
The Place of Science in Modern Civilisation, and Other Essays
Veblen, Thorstein
Economics; Science
need not, therefore, necessarily serve these generic human interests.[3]
Therefore, other inducements than the unmitigated impact of pecuniary
exigencies may be necessary to bring about a coincidence of class or
individual endeavor with the interests of the community. It becomes
incumbent on the advocate of _laissez-faire_ to "prove his minor
premise." It is no longer self-evident that: "Interests left to
themselves tend to harmonious combinations, and to the progressive
preponderance of the general good."[4]
The natural-rights preconception begins to fall away as soon as the
hedonistic mechanics have been seriously tampered with. Fact and right
cease to coincide, because the individual in whom the rights are
conceived to inhere has come to be something more than the field of
intersection of natural forces that work out in human conduct. The
mechanics of natural liberty--that assumed constitution of things by
force of which the free hedonistic play of the laws of nature across the
open field of individual choice is sure to reach the right outcome--is
the hedonistic psychology; and the passing of the doctrine of natural
rights and natural liberty, whether as a premise or as a dogma,
therefore coincides with the passing of that mechanics of conduct on the
validity of which the theoretical acceptance of the dogma depends. It
is, therefore, something more than a coincidence that the half-century
which has seen the disintegration of the hedonistic faith and of the
associational psychology has also seen the dissipation, in scientific
speculations, of the concomitant faith in natural rights and in that
benign order of nature of which the natural-rights dogma is a corollary.
It is, of course, not hereby intended to say that the later
psychological views and premises imply a less close dependence of
conduct on environment than do the earlier ones. Indeed, the reverse may
well be held to be true. The pervading characteristic of later thinking
is the constant recourse to a detailed analysis of phenomena in causal
terms. The modern catchword, in the present connection, is "response to
stimulus"; but the manner in which this response is conceived has
changed. The fact, and ultimately the amplitude, at least in great part,
of the reaction to stimulus, is conditioned by the forces in impact; but
the constitution of the organism, as well as its attitude at the moment
of impact, in great part decides what will serve as a stimulus, as well
as what the manner and direction of the response will be.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account