The Place of Science in Modern Civilisation, and Other EssaysVeblen, Thorstein
Philosophy
The Place of Science in Modern Civilisation, and Other Essays
Veblen, Thorstein
Economics; Science
It had come to be a commonplace of the physical sciences that "natural
laws" are of the nature of empirical generalisations simply, or even of
the nature of arithmetical averages. Even the underlying preconception
of the modern physical sciences--the law of the conservation of energy,
or persistence of quantity--was claimed to be an empirical
generalisation, arrived at inductively and verified by experiment. It is
true the alleged proof of the law took the whole conclusion for granted
at the start, and used it constantly as a tacit axiom at every step in
the argument which was to establish its truth; but that fact serves
rather to emphasise than to call in question the abiding faith which
these empiricists had in the sole efficacy of empirical generalisation.
Had they been able overtly to admit any other than an associational
origin of knowledge, they would have seen the impossibility of
accounting on the mechanical grounds of association for the premise on
which all experience of mechanical fact rests. That any other than a
mechanical origin should be assigned to experience, or that any other
than a so-conceived empirical ground was to be admitted for any general
principle, was incompatible with the prejudices of men trained in the
school of the associational psychology, however widely they perforce
departed from this ideal in practice. Nothing of the nature of a
personal element was to be admitted into these fundamental empirical
generalisations; and nothing, therefore, of the nature of a
discretionary or teleological movement was to be comprised in the
generalisations to be accepted as "natural laws." Natural laws must in
no degree be imbued with personality, must say nothing of an ulterior
end; but for all that they remained "laws" of the sequences subsumed
under them. So far is the reduction to colorless terms carried by Mill,
for instance, that he formulates the natural laws as empirically
ascertained sequences simply, even excluding or avoiding all imputation
of causal continuity, as that term is commonly understood by the
unsophisticated. In Mill's ideal no more of organic connection or
continuity between the members of a sequence is implied in subsuming
them under a law of causal relationship than is given by the ampersand.
He is busied with dynamic sequences, but he persistently confines
himself to static terms.
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