The Place of Science in Modern Civilisation, and Other EssaysVeblen, Thorstein
Philosophy
The Place of Science in Modern Civilisation, and Other Essays
Veblen, Thorstein
Economics; Science
The premises and the point of view required for an evolutionary
economics have been wanting. The economists have not had the materials
for such a science ready to their hand, and the provocation to strike
out in such a direction has been absent. Even if it has been possible at
any time to turn to the evolutionary line of speculation in economics,
the possibility of a departure is not enough to bring it about. So long
as the habitual view taken of a given range of facts is of the taxonomic
kind and the material lends itself to treatment by that method, the
taxonomic method is the easiest, gives the most gratifying immediate
results, and best fits into the accepted body of knowledge of the range
of facts in question. This has been the situation in economics. The
other sciences of its group have likewise been a body of taxonomic
discipline, and departures from the accredited method have lain under
the odium of being meretricious innovations. The well-worn paths are
easy to follow and lead into good company. Advance along them visibly
furthers the accredited work which the science has in hand. Divergence
from the paths means tentative work, which is necessarily slow and
fragmentary and of uncertain value.
It is only when the methods of the science and the syntheses resulting
from their use come to be out of line with habits of thought that
prevail in other matters that the scientist grows restive under the
guidance of the received methods and standpoints, and seeks a way out.
Like other men, the economist is an individual with but one
intelligence. He is a creature of habits and propensities given through
the antecedents, hereditary and cultural, of which he is an outcome; and
the habits of thought formed in any one line of experience affect his
thinking in any other. Methods of observation and of handling facts
that are familiar through habitual use in the general range of
knowledge, gradually assert themselves in any given special range of
knowledge. They may be accepted slowly and with reluctance where their
acceptance involves innovation; but, if they have the continued backing
of the general body of experience, it is only a question of time when
they shall come into dominance in the special field. The intellectual
attitude and the method of correlation enforced upon us in the
apprehension and assimilation of facts in the more elementary ranges of
knowledge that have to do with brute facts assert themselves also when
the attention is directed to those phenomena of the life process with
which economics has to do; and the range of facts which are habitually
handled by other methods than that in traditional vogue in economics has
now become so large and so insistently present at every turn that we are
left restless, if the new body of facts cannot be handled according to
the method of mental procedure which is in this way becoming habitual.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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