[348] _Aristotle_, Nicomach. Ethics bk. VII. ch. 5., ἀλλὰ μὴν οὕτω διατίθενται οἱ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν ὄντες· θυμοὶ γὰρ καὶ ἐπιθυμίαι ἀφροδισίων καὶ ἔνια τῶν τοιούτων ἐπιδήλως καὶ τὸ σῶμα μεθιστᾶσιν, ἐνίοις δὲ καὶ _μανίας_ ποιοῦσιν· δῆλον οὖν ὅτι ὁμοίως ἔχειν λεκτέον τοὺς _ἀκρατεῖς_ τούτοις. cap. 6. αἱ δὲ νοσηματώδεις ἢ ἐξ ἔθους, οἱον τριχῶν τίλσεις καὶ ὀνύχων τρώξεις, ἔτι δ’ ἀνθράκων καὶ γῆς, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἡ τῶν _ἀφροδισίων τοῖς ἄρρεσιν_· τοῖς μὲν γὰρ φύσει τοῖς δ’ ἐξ ἔθους συμβαίνουσιν, οἱον τοῖς ὑβριζομένοις ἐκ παίδων· ὅσοις μὲν οὖν φύσις αἰτία, τούτους μὲν οὐδεὶς ἂν εἴπειεν ἀκρατεῖς, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὰς γυναῖκας, ὅτι οὐκ ὀπυίουσιν ἀλλ’ ὀπυίονται.—πᾶσα γὰρ ὑπερβάλλουσα καὶ ἀφροσύνη καὶ δειλία καὶ ἀκολασία καὶ χαλεπότης αἱ μὲν θηριώδεις αἱ δὲ νοσηματώδεις εἰσίν. ch. 8. ἀνάγκη γὰρ τοῦτον μὴ εἰναι μεταμελητικόν, ὥστ’ ἀνίατος· _ὁ γὰρ ἀμεταμέλητος ἀνίατος_·—ὁ δ’ ἐλλείπων πρὸς ἃ οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ ἀντιτείνουσι καὶ δύνανται, οὗτος μαλακὸς καὶ τρυφῶν· καὶ γὰρ ἡ τρυφὴ μαλακία τίς ἐστιν· ὅς ἕλκει τὸ ἱμάτιον, ἵνα μὴ πονήσῃ τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ αἴρειν λύπην κ. τ. λ. ... ἀλλ’ εἴ τις πρὸς ἃ οἱ πολλοὶ δύνανται ἀντέχειν, τούτων ἡττᾶται καὶ μὴ δύναται ἀντιτείνειν, μὴ διὰ φύσιν τοῦ γένους ἢ διὰ νόσον, οἷον _ἐν τοῖς Σκυθῶν βασιλεῦσιν ἡ μαλακία διὰ τὸ γένος_, καὶ ὡς τὸ θῆλυ πρὸς τὸ ἄρρεν διέστηκεν· δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ ὁ παιδιώδης ἀκόλαστος εἶναι, ἔστι δὲ μαλακός.—_ἀκρασίας_ δὲ τὸ μὲν προπέτεια τὸ δ’ _ἀσθένεια_· οἱ μὲν γὰρ βουλευσάμενοι οὐκ ἐμμένουσιν οἷς ἐβουλεύσαντο διὰ τὸ _πάθος_, οἱ δὲ διὰ τὸ μὴ βουλεύσασθαι ἄγονται _ὑπὸ τοῦ πάθους_. (ch. 5., But this is the very condition of people who are under the influence of passion; for fits of anger and the desires of sensual pleasures and some such things do unmistakably produce a change in the condition of the body, and in some cases actually cause madness. It is clear then that we must regard incontinent people as being in much the same condition as people so affected, i.e. people asleep or mad or intoxicated.—ch. 6., Other such states again are the results of a morbid disposition or of habit, as e.g. the practice of plucking out one’s hair, or biting one’s nails, or eating cinders and earth, _or of committing unnatural vice_; for these habits are sometimes natural,—when a person’s nature is vicious,—and sometimes acquired, as e.g. by those who are the victims of outrage from childhood. Now whenever nature is the cause of these habits, nobody would call people who give way to them incontinent, any more than we should call women incontinent for being not males, but females.—For all excess whether of folly, cowardice, incontinence, or savagery is either brutal or morbid.—ch. 8., for he is necessarily incapable of repentance and is therefore incurable, as to be incapable of _repentance is to be incurable_:—If a person gives in where people generally resist and are capable of resisting, he deserves to be called effeminate and luxurious; for luxury is a form of effeminacy. Such a person will