The plurality of the human racePouchet, G. (Georges)
Philosophy
The plurality of the human race
Pouchet, G. (Georges)
Monogenism and polygenism
In Buffon’s last opinion[292] species was not that definite entity in
which Cuvier believed, commencing at a given geological moment, in
order to terminate at another. Buffon says, in his latest works, that
the idea of species can only be seized upon by man at “this or that
instant of his age,”[293] and that it is merely the expression of the
ambient medium. Let this remain as before, it will not change; but when
the conditions of the medium become modified, _species_ will change. We
thus arrive at this definition:--
DEFINITION.--“_Species is a collection or group of individuals
characterised by a similarity of distinctive points; the transmission
of which is accomplished naturally, regularly, and indefinitely, in a
given order of things._”[294]
It is, in more scientific terms, the definition by Lamarck, “a
collection of similar individuals which generation perpetuates in
the same state, so that the circumstances of their situation do not
sufficiently alter so as to make their habits, their character, or
their form vary.”[295] Lamarck, to whom Isidore Geoffroy has rendered
greater justice than any one else before or after him,[296] admitted
the _unlimited variableness of species_. He admitted that we all
descend, just as we are, from an anatomical element, developed in a
determinate sense, and that we may have been worms, insects,[297]
birds, and mammals before becoming men, running through all the phases
through which animal organisation has passed during our uterine life.
We see that Lamarck approached frankly and resolutely the problem of
the origin of humanity.
In taking but superficially certain exaggerations into which Lamarck
fell, at a time less rich in facts than our own, it is not difficult
to give a certain grotesque turn to his ideas, and to laugh at them as
being unnatural; but we must not thus judge the work of a man’s whole
life, and we must appreciate Lamarck by the basis of his doctrine more
than by the examples he has given us: “a profound philosopher,” said
Étienne Geoffroy,[298] “able in laying down principles, less able in
the choice of his proofs.”
We must judge Lamarck as Isidore Geoffroy has done in his _Histoire
Naturelle Générale_, where we find a complete and impartial
chronological statement concerning the grave question of species.[299]
“Circumstances have an influence upon form and organisation,” such is
the fundamental principle of Lamarck’s doctrine;[300] he says the same
elsewhere:[301] “Circumstances determine positively what each body
may be;” and he concludes, “among living bodies, nature only shows
individuals who succeed one another. Species, amongst themselves, are
only _relative_, and are only temporarily so.”[302]
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