A finically Scrupulous and detailed examination of Sun Yat-sen’s programs for _min shêng_ is intellectually unremunerative, since it has been established that _min shêng_ may be called empirical collectivism; collectivism which is empirical cannot be rigidly programmatic, or it loses its empirical character. Sun, not accepting the dialectics of historical materialism, and following the traditionally Chinese pragmatic way of thinking, could not orient his revolution in a world of economic predestinations. With the characteristic Chinese emphasis on men rather than on rules and principles, Sun Yat-sen knew that if China were ruled by the right sort of men, his programs would be carried through in accordance with the expediency of the moment. He does not appear to have considered, as do some of the left wing, that it was possible for the revolutionary movement to be diverted to the control of unworthy persons. Even had he foreseen such a possible state of affairs, he would not, in all probability, have settled his programs any more rigidly; he knew, from the most intimate and heart-breaking experience, how easy it is in China to pay lip-service to principles which are rejected. The first Republic had taught him that. One must consequently regard the programs of national economic revolution, of industrial revolution, and of social revolution as tentative and general outlines of the course which Sun wished the Nationalist Kuomintang and state to follow in carrying out _min shêng_. Of these programs, the one least likely to be affected by political or personal changes was that of the industrial revolution, and it is this which is most detailed.(326) His great desire was that the Chinese race-nation continue, not merely to subsist, but to thrive and multiply and become great, so that it could restore the ancient morality and wisdom of China, as well as become proficient in the Western sciences. A last suggestion may be made concerning the programs of Sun Yat-sen, before consideration of the Utopia which lay at the end of the road of _min shêng_. His plans may continue to go on in _min shêng_ because they are so empirical. His nationalism may be deflected or altered by the new situation in world politics. His optimism concerning the rapidity of democratic developments may not be justified by actual developments. The programs of _min shêng_ are so general that they can be followed to some degree by governments of almost any orientation along the Right-Left scale. The really important criterion in the programs of _min shêng_ is this: the people must live. It is a simple one to understand, and may be a great force in the continued development of his programs, to the last stage of _min shêng_. The Utopia of _Min Shêng_.