244 Among the persons whom he entrusted with the task of seeking foreign capital for the just and honorable national development of China through international means were George Bronson Rea and Paul Linebarger. Mr. Rea was given a power of attorney by Sun to secure loans for railway purposes to an unlimited amount. Mr. Rea never used the document, but kept it among his papers. (Statement of Mr. Rea to the author in Washington, spring of 1934, at the time that the former was “Special Counsellor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Manchoukuo,” despite his former Chinese connections.) Judge Linebarger was also unsuccessful. Sun Yat-sen was more interested in having Judge Linebarger stop any assistance offered by the Consortium to the Northern “Republic of China” than in having him procure any actual funds. 245 It is obvious that a strong China would be a horrid nightmare to Japan. Not only would the Chinese thwart the use of their man-power and natural resources, as stepping stones to Asiatic or world hegemony; they might even equal the Japanese in audacity, and think of restoring the Japanese to the position of Chinese vassals which they had enjoyed in the time of Yoshemitsu, the third Ashikaga Shogun. 246 Tsui, cited, pp. 115-116. 247 Hu Han-min, cited in Tsui, work cited, p. 118, n. 63. 248 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 152. For a full discussion of this curious relationship between China and her vassal states, see Djang Chu (Chang Tso), _The Chinese Suzerainty_, Johns Hopkins University doctoral dissertation, 1935. The submission to China was, among other things, a means by which the rulers of the peripheral states could get themselves recognized by an authority higher than themselves, thus legitimizing their position.