The Political History of England - Vol XI: From Addington's Administration to the close of William IV.'s Reign (1801-1837)Brodrick, George C. (George Charles)
History
The Political History of England - Vol XI: From Addington's Administration to the close of William IV.'s Reign (1801-1837)
Brodrick, George C. (George Charles)
Great Britain -- History -- 1800-1837; Great Britain -- Politics and government -- 1800-1837
When this route was adopted it was anticipated that the
different divisions of the British army would be able to unite at, or
near, Valladolid. But the advance of the French rendered this
impossible, and Hope ultimately joined Moore at Salamanca on December 4.
Baird suffered from even more vexatious delays. Though the greater part
of his convoy had arrived at Coruña on October 13, the local junta would
not permit them to land without express orders from the central junta at
Aranjuez. Consequently the disembarkation did not begin till the 26th
and was only finished on November 4. Transport and equipment were
difficult to obtain, and on November 22 Baird was still only at Astorga.
There exaggerated reports of the French advance induced him to halt, but
by Moore's orders he continued his march. On the 28th the news of the
defeat of Castaños at Tudela reached Moore at Salamanca. Co-operation
with a Spanish army now appeared impossible, and even a junction with
Baird seemed too hazardous to attempt. Moore therefore, ordered Baird to
retire on Coruña and to proceed to Lisbon by sea, and, while waiting
himself at Salamanca for Hope, made preparations for a retreat to
Portugal. On December 5, the day after his junction with Hope, Moore
determined to continue his advance. He had received news of the
enthusiastic preparations for the defence of Madrid but did not know of
its fall, and he considered that the Spanish enthusiasm justified some
risk on the part of the British troops. He accordingly recalled Baird,
whose infantry had retired to Villafranca, though his cavalry were still
at Astorga. On the 9th came the news of the fall of Madrid, but Moore
believed that an attack on the French lines of communication might still
prove useful, and on the 11th the advance was renewed. Moore himself
left Salamanca on the 13th. On the 12th he learned for the first time
from some prisoners the true strength of the French army, 250,000 of all
arms, and also discovered that the enemy were in complete ignorance of
the position of his own army. Next day an intercepted despatch showed
him that he might possibly be able to cut off Soult in an isolated
position at Saldaña. Having at last effected a junction with Baird's
corps on the 19th he reached Sahagun on the 21st, and was on the point
of delivering his attack under favourable conditions, though his triumph
must have been short-lived.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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