The capture of Moscow was far from being the triumph that the French emperor had anticipated. Deceived by his recollections of Tilsit, he had fully counted upon receiving pacific overtures from Alexander or at least upon his eager acceptance of conciliatory assurances from himself. But as the weeks passed and the vision of negotiation with the Russians proved illusory, retreat became inevitable. On the night of October 18 the French army, now about 115,000 strong, evacuated Moscow. Kutuzov, who was stronger in cavalry, though perhaps still weaker in infantry, hung upon its rear, and, while avoiding a pitched battle, was able to prevent Napoleon from retreating by any other route than the now devastated line of his advance. It has often been questioned whether Kutuzov did not deliberately refrain from destroying the French army. He certainly informed Sir Robert Wilson on one occasion that he did not wish to drive Napoleon to extremities, lest his supremacy should go to the power that ruled the sea. The remark may have been nothing more than an outburst of ill-temper, but, whatever the motive, there can be no doubt as to the policy adopted. The retreating French army suffered terrible hardships from the cold, for which it was ill prepared. Twice it seemed on the point of falling into the hands of the Russians; at Krasnoe 26,000 prisoners are said to have been captured by Kutuzov's army, while at Borisov the southern army under Chichagov and the army returning from Finland under Wittgenstein joined hands, and disputed the French passage of the Berezina on November 26-29. According to Chambray's calculation, the French army numbered 31,000 combatants before the passage, of whom but 9,000 remained on December 1. All the non-combatants had been left in the hands of the enemy.