The positive outcome of philosophyDietzgen, Joseph
Philosophy
The positive outcome of philosophy
Dietzgen, Joseph
Knowledge, Theory of; Logic; Philosophy
If our ideas are to adapt themselves to truth, or to reality, instead of
reality or truth adapting itself to our notions or thoughts, we must
understand that the mutability of that which is right, holy, moral, is a
natural, necessary and true fact. And we must grant to an individual the
theoretical freedom which cannot be taken from it in practice, we must
admit that it is as free now as it has ever been, that laws must be
adapted to the needs of the social individual and not to the vague,
unreal, and impossible abstractions, such as justice or morality. What
is justice? The embodiment of all that is considered right, an
individual conception, which assumes different forms in different
persons. In reality only individual, definite, concrete rights exist,
and man simply comes along and abstracts from them the idea of justice,
just as he abstracted from different kinds of wood the conception of
wood in general, or from material things the conception of matter. It is
just as far from the truth, to think that material things consist of, or
are by virtue of, abstract matter, although this view is widely spread,
as it is to believe that the moral or bourgeois laws were derived from
the idea of justice.
The ethical loss caused by our realistic, or if you prefer,
materialistic, conception of morality is not so great as it appears. We
need not fear that through this conception social beings will become
lawless cannibals or hermits. Freedom and lawfulness are closely allied
by the need for association which compels us to permit others to live
together with us. If a man is prevented by his conscience or by other
spiritualistic or bourgeois ethics from committing unlawful
actions--unlawful in the wider meaning of the term--he is either not
exposed to very grave temptations, or he has a nature so tame that the
natural or legal punishments fully suffice to keep him within prescribed
bounds. But where these checks are ineffective, morality is likewise
powerless. If it were otherwise, we should have to assume that morality
exerts in secret the same influence on the faithful which is exerted by
public opinion on the faithless. But we know from actual experience that
there are more pious thieves than infidel robbers. That the world, which
attributes so much value for social welfare to morality by word of
mouth, actually shares this view of ours, is proven by the fact that
bourgeois society gives more attention to the penal code and to the
police than to the influence of morality.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account