The positive outcome of philosophyDietzgen, Joseph
Philosophy
The positive outcome of philosophy
Dietzgen, Joseph
Knowledge, Theory of; Logic; Philosophy
Although we know that reason is attached to perceptible matter, to
physical objects, so that science can never be anything else but the
science of the physical, still we may, according to the prevailing ideas
and usage of language, separate physics from logic and ethics, and thus
distinguish them as different forms of science. The problem is then to
demonstrate that in physics as well as in logic, as also in ethics, the
general or intellectual perceptions can be practically obtained only on
the basis of concrete perceptible facts.
This practice of reason, to generate thought from matter, to arrive at
understanding by sense perceptions, to produce the general out of the
concrete, has been universally accepted in physical investigation, but
only in practice. The inductive method is employed, and one is aware of
this fact, but it is not understood that the nature of inductive science
is the nature of science in general, of reason. The process of thought
is misunderstood. Physical science lacks the theory of understanding and
for this reason often falls out of its practical step. The faculty of
thought is still an unknown, mysterious, mystical being for natural
science. Either it confounds the function with the organ, the mind with
the brain, as do the materialists, or it thinks with the idealists that
the faculty of thought is an imperceptible object outside of its field.
We see modern investigators marching toward their goal with firm and
uniform steps, so far as physical matters are concerned. But they
aimlessly grope around in the abstract relations of these things. The
inductive method has been practically adopted by natural science and its
successes have secured a great reputation for it. On the other hand, the
speculative method has become discredited by its failures. There is,
however, no conscious understanding of these various methods of thought.
We see the men of physical research, when they are outside of their
special field, offer lawyer-like speculations in lieu of scientific
facts. While they arrive at the special truths of their chosen fields by
sense perceptions, they still pretend to derive speculative truths out
of the depths of their own minds.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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