The positive outcome of philosophyDietzgen, Joseph
Philosophy
The positive outcome of philosophy
Dietzgen, Joseph
Knowledge, Theory of; Logic; Philosophy
Sense perception is the standard of truth, or of science in general. The
phenomena of the outside world are the standard of physical truths, and
man with his many wants is the standard of moral truth. The actions of
man are determined by his wants. Thirst teaches him to drink, need to
pray. Wants are regulated in the South by southern conditions, in the
North by northern conditions. Wants rule time and space, nations and
individuals. They induce the savage to hunt and the gourmand to indulge.
Human wants give to reason a standard for judging what is good, right,
bad, reasonable, etc. Whatever satisfies our need is good, the opposite
is bad. The physical feeling of man is the object of moral standards,
the object of "practical reason." The contradictory variety of human
needs is the basis for the contradictory variety of moral standards.
Because a member of a feudal guild prospered in a restricted
competition, and a modern knight of industry in free competition,
because their interests differ, therefore their views differ, and the
one justly considers an institution as unreasonable which the other
regards as reasonable. If the intellect of some person attempts to
define by mere introspection the standard of reasonableness as a general
thing, this person makes himself or herself the standard of humanity. If
reason is credited with the faculty of finding within itself the source
of moral truth, it commits the speculative mistake of attempting to
produce understanding without perceptible objects. The same mistake is
to blame for the idea that man is subordinate to the authority of
reason, for the demand that man submit to the dictates of reason. This
idea transforms man into an attribute of reason, while in reality reason
is an attribute of man.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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