The positive outcome of philosophyDietzgen, Joseph
Philosophy
The positive outcome of philosophy
Dietzgen, Joseph
Knowledge, Theory of; Logic; Philosophy
procedure, a negative practice, which ignores facts on the pretense
that they are irrational, but it is not a positive understanding, not an
intelligent knowledge, such as manifests itself by the conciliation of
contradictions.
If our study aims to ascertain what is universally human and reasonable,
and if these predicates are given only to actions which are reasonable
and practicable for all men, at all times, and under all conditions,
then such concepts are absolute, indeterminate, and to that extent
meaningless, indefinite generalities. We are stating such universal and
indeterminate, and therefore unimportant and unpractical concepts, when
we say that physically the whole is greater than a part, or that morally
the good is preferable to the bad. The object of reason is that which is
general, but it is the generality of some concrete object. The practice
of reason deals with individual and concrete objects, with the things
which are the opposite of the general, with special and concrete
knowledge. In order to perceive in physics whether we are dealing with a
part or with the whole object, we must handle definite and concrete
objects or phenomena. If we desire to ascertain what is morally
preferable as good or bad, we must start out with a definite quantity of
human needs. Abstract and general reason, with its socalled eternal and
absolute truths, is a phantasmagoria of ignorance which binds the rights
of the individual with crushing chains. Real and true reason is
individual, it cannot produce any other but individual perceptions, and
these perceptions cannot be generalized to any greater extent than the
general material with which they operate. Only that is universally
reasonable which is acknowledged to be so by all reasons. If the reason
of some time, class, or person is referred to as rational, and if some
other time, class or person considers it irrational; if, for instance,
the Russian noble considers serfdom a rational institution and the
English bourgeois the so-called liberty of his wage worker, both of
these institutions are not absolutely rational, but only relatively,
only in a more or less limited circle.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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