The positive outcome of philosophyDietzgen, Joseph
Philosophy
The positive outcome of philosophy
Dietzgen, Joseph
Knowledge, Theory of; Logic; Philosophy
classes, nations, times, or circumstances, which has any practical
value, and it is so much more practical the more defined, exact, precise
and the less general it is.
The most universal and most widely recognized right or need is in its
quality no more rightful, better, or valuable than the most
insignificant right of the moment, than the momentary need of some
individual. Although we know that the sun is hundreds of thousands of
miles in diameter, we are nevertheless free to see it no larger than a
plate. And though we may acknowledge that some moral law is
theoretically or universally good or holy, we are free in practice to
reject it momentarily, in parts, or individually, as bad and useless.
Even the most sacred right of the most universal extent is valid only
within certain definite limits, and within particular limits an
otherwise very great wrong may be a valid right. It is true that there
is an eternal difference between assumed and true interests, between
passion and reason, between essential, predominating, general,
well-founded needs and inclinations, and accidental, subordinate,
special appetites. But this difference is not one of two separated
worlds, a world of the good and a world of the bad. It is not a
positive, general, continuous, absolute difference, but merely a
relative one. Like the difference between beautiful and homely, it
depends on the individuality of the person who distinguishes. That which
is a true and fundamental need in one case, is a secondary, subordinate,
and wrong desire in another.
_Morality is the aggregate of the most contradictory ethical laws which
serve the common purpose of regulating the conduct of man toward himself
and others in such a way that the future is considered as well as the
present, the one as well as the other, the individual as well as the
genus. The individual man finds himself lacking, inadequate, limited in
many ways. He requires for his complement other people, society, and
must therefore live and let live. The mutual concessions which arise out
of these relative needs are called morality._
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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