Solomon, on different occasions, condemns the practice of suretyship. This condemnation is general. It does not follow, however, that what he says is to be taken as an unqualified prohibition, to which there are no circumstances that can constitute an exception. . . . There are cases in which it is unavoidable; and there are cases in which the law requires it; and there are cases in which it is not only in consistence with law, but required by all the claims of prudence, justice, and charity. These, however, are rare. And it may be laid down as a maxim regarding the transactions of business, and all the mutual dealings of man with man, that _the less of it the better_. In such cases as the following, it is manifestly inadmissible, and may even, in some instances, involve a large amount of moral turpitude. +I. It is wrong for a man to come under engagements that are beyond his actually existing means.+ Such a course is not merely of imprudence, but there is in it a _threefold injustice._ First, to the creditor for whom he becomes surety. Secondly, to his family, if he has one, to whom the requisition of payment must bring distress and ruin. Thirdly, to those who give him credit in his own transactions, with the risks of his own trade. +II. The same observations are applicable to the making of engagements with inconsideration and rashness.+ The case here supposed is evidently that of suretyship _for_ a friend _to_ a _stranger._ And the rashness may be viewed either in relation to the _person_ or to the _case._--_Wardlaw._