Lloyd George, David, 1863-1945; Prime ministers -- Great Britain -- Biography
Ludendorff has told us that even then there was some debate among the
German military chiefs between the policy of defence in the West and the
policy of attack. But Mr. Lloyd George saw clearly that the Germans
would be obliged to attack. They were compelled by the logic of the
blockade. With all her feverish triumphs in the East of Europe, Germany
was, at that moment, in a parlous plight. She was in the position of a
besieged city. She had either to break out or to surrender. The fearful
ravage which she perpetrated in Rumania and the Ukraine, and in the
western provinces of Russia also, were really the measure of her need.
Food and materials were more necessary for her at that moment than
military triumphs, and she hastened to cash all her victories into
material produce of one kind or another. Like a hungry tiger, she
devoured her prey. But there were other beasts afoot in Eastern Europe
at the same time, and we know now that the division of the loot caused
extreme bitterness between Germany and Austria-Hungary, and that the
resentment of the Ukraine forced Germany to keep troops in the East of
Europe which might have struck the decisive blow in the West. Such is
the Nemesis of greed.
But still Germany could realise immediately over 2,000,000 new fighting
men for the grand sortie now planned on the Western Front, and
Ludendorff has told us how quickly and strenuously he trained the troops
for this gigantic effort. The blow came on March 21st, against the Third
and Fourth British Armies between the Scarpe and the Oise. Forty German
divisions attacked, and on the second day, the 22nd, there was a
break-through west of St. Quentin. On the following days the British
line had to withdraw nearly fifteen miles, back to the line of the
Somme, losing prisoners all the way, but inflicting very heavy losses on
the attacking division. The British line was broken, but not the British
Army. During the following days the German divisions steadily poured
through the gap, crossing the Somme, capturing Albert and Mezières, some
90,000 British prisoners, and over 1,300 guns.
The peril opened by this event both to France and the British Empire
lasted for four months, and during that period there was scarcely a day
on which the strain was relaxed. Colossal issues were at stake, and
among the chief was whether the British Empire should survive. Mr. Lloyd
George rose to the height of the crisis at once, and kept on the summit
until the close. Day by day he never relaxed his energy or his courage.
He did not abate, in those dark days, one jot of heart or hope. There
was no resource or reserve of national strength which he did not bring
to bear. There was no device that he left untried. It is easy to speak
of the hurricane and storm when you have reached harbour, but there is
little doubt that, unless we had had a good captain on the bridge, the
great ship “British Empire” would have foundered.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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