To the classical mechanics (no less than) to the special relativity
theory, is attached an episteomological defect, which was perhaps first
cleanly pointed out by E. Mach. We shall illustrate it by the following
example; Let two fluid bodies of equal kind and magnitude swim freely in
space at such a great distance from one another (and from all other
masses) that only that sort of gravitational forces are to be taken into
account which the parts of any of these bodies exert upon each other.
The distance of the bodies from one another is invariable. The relative
motion of the different parts of each body is not to occur. But each
mass is seen to rotate by an observer at rest relative to the other mass
round the connecting line of the masses with a constant angular velocity
(definite relative motion for both the masses). Now let us think that
the surfaces of both the bodies (S₁ and S₂) are measured with the help
of measuring rods (relatively at rest); it is then found that the
surface of S₁ is a sphere and the surface of the other is an ellipsoid
of rotation. We now ask, why is this difference between the two bodies?
An answer to this question can only then be regarded as satisfactory
from the episteomological standpoint when the thing adduced as the cause
is an observable fact of experience. The law of causality has the sense
of a definite statement about the world of experience only when
observable facts alone appear as causes and effects.
The Newtonian mechanics does not give to this question any satisfactory
answer. For example, it says:—The laws of mechanics hold true for a
space R₁ relative to which the body S₁ is at rest, not however for a
space relative to which S₂ is at rest.
The Galiliean space, which is here introduced is however only a purely
imaginary cause, not an observable thing. It is thus clear that the
Newtonian mechanics does not, in the case treated here, actually fulfil
the requirements of causality, but produces on the mind a fictitious
complacency, in that it makes responsible a _wholly imaginary cause_ R₁
for the different behaviours of the bodies S₁ and S₂ which are actually
observable.
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