The Principles of Psychology, Volume 1 (of 2)James, William
Philosophy
The Principles of Psychology, Volume 1 (of 2)
James, William
Psychology
Where the elemental units are supposed to be feelings, the case is in
no wise altered. Take a hundred of them, shuffle them and pack them as
close together as you can (whatever that may mean); still each remains
the same feeling it always was, shut in its own skin, windowless,
ignorant of what the other feelings are and mean. There would be a
hundred-and-first feeling there, if, when a group or series of such
feelings were set up, a consciousness _belonging to the group as such_
should emerge. And this 101st feeling would be a totally new fact; the
100 original feelings might, by a curious physical law, be a signal
for its _creation_, when they came together; but they would have no
substantial identity with it, nor it with them, and one could never
deduce the one from the others, or (in any intelligible sense) say that
they _evolved_ it.
Take a sentence of a dozen words, and take twelve men and tell to each
one word. Then stand the men in a row or jam them in a bunch, and let
each think of his word as intently as he will; nowhere will there be
a consciousness of the whole sentence.[175] We talk of the 'spirit of
the age,' and the 'sentiment of the people,' and in various ways we
hypostatize 'public opinion.' But we know this to be symbolic speech,
and never dream that the spirit, opinion, sentiment, etc., constitute
a consciousness other than, and additional to, that of the several
individuals whom the words 'age,' 'people,' or 'public' denote. The
private minds do not agglomerate into a higher compound mind. This has
always been the invincible contention of the spiritualists against the
associationists in Psychology,--a contention which we shall take up
at greater length in Chapter X. The associationists say the mind is
constituted by a multiplicity of distinct 'ideas' _associated_ into
a unity. There is, they say, an idea of _a_, and also an idea of _b.
Therefore,_ they say, there is an idea of _a_ + _b_, or of _a_ and _b_
together. Which is like saying that the mathematical square of _a_ plus
that of _b_ is equal to the square of _a_ + _b_, a palpable untruth.
Idea of _a_ + idea of _b_ is _not_ identical with idea of (_a_ + _b_).
It is one, they are two; in it, what knows _a_ also knows _b_; in them,
what knows _a_ is expressly posited as not knowing _b_; etc. In short,
the two separate ideas can never by any logic be made to figure as one
and the same thing as the 'associated' idea.
This is what the spiritualists keep saying; and since we do, as a
matter of fact, have the 'compounded' idea, and do know _a_ and _b_
together, they adopt a farther hypothesis to explain that fact. The
separate ideas exist, they say, but _affect_ a third entity, the soul.
_This_ has the 'compounded' idea, if you please so to call it; and the
compounded idea is an altogether new psychic fact to which the separate
ideas stand in the relation, not of constituents, but of occasions of
production.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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