The Principles of Psychology, Volume 1 (of 2)James, William
Philosophy
The Principles of Psychology, Volume 1 (of 2)
James, William
Psychology
becomes one which must be discussed. Sleep, fainting, coma, epilepsy,
and other 'unconscious' conditions are apt to break in upon and occupy
large durations of what we nevertheless consider the mental history of
a single man. And, the fact of interruption being admitted, is it not
possible that it may exist where we do not suspect it, and even perhaps
in an incessant and fine-grained form?
This might happen, and yet the subject himself never know it. We often
take ether and have operations performed without a suspicion that our
consciousness has suffered a breach. The two ends join each other
smoothly over the gap; and only the sight of our wound assures us
that we must have been living through a time which for our immediate
consciousness was non-existent. Even in sleep this sometimes happens:
We think we have had no nap, and it takes the clock to assure us that
we are wrong.[198] We thus may live through a real outward time, a time
known by the psychologist who studies us, and yet not _feel_ the time,
or infer it from any inward sign. The question is, how often does this
happen? Is consciousness really discontinuous, incessantly interrupted
and recommencing (from the psychologist's point of view)? and does it
only seem continuous to itself by an illusion analogous to that of the
zoetrope? Or is it at most times as continuous outwardly as it inwardly
seems?
It must be confessed that we can give no rigorous answer to this
question. Cartesians, who hold that the _essence_ of the soul is to
think, can of course solve it _a priori_, and explain the appearance of
thoughtless intervals either by lapses in our ordinary memory, or by
the sinking of consciousness to a minimal state, in which perhaps all
that it feels is a bare existence which leaves no particulars behind to
be recalled. If, however, one have no doctrine about the soul or its
essence, one is free to take the appearances for what they seem to be,
and to admit that the mind, as well as the body, may go to sleep.
Locke was the first prominent champion of this latter view, and the
pages in which he attacks the Cartesian belief are as spirited as any
in his Essay. "Every drowsy nod shakes their doctrine who teach that
their soul is always thinking." He will not believe that men so easily
forget. M. Jouffroy and Sir W. Hamilton, attacking the question in the
same empirical way, are led to an opposite conclusion. Their reasons,
briefly stated, are these:
In somnambulism, natural or induced, there is often a great display of
intellectual activity, followed by complete oblivion of all that has
passed.[199]
On being suddenly awakened from a sleep, however profound, we always
catch ourselves in the middle of a dream. Common dreams are often
remembered for a few minutes after waking, and then irretrievably lost.
Frequently, when awake and absent-minded, we are visited by thoughts
and images which the next instant we cannot recall.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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