The Principles of Psychology, Volume 1 (of 2)James, William
Philosophy
The Principles of Psychology, Volume 1 (of 2)
James, William
Psychology
because of the lack of all the conditions to give such figures any
meaning. It is not even clear that we shall ever find our way out
of the darkness into the world of light and reality again. We begin
with complete trust in physics and the senses, and are forthwith
led away from the object into a nervous labyrinth, where the object
is entirely displaced by a set of nervous changes which are totally
unlike anything but themselves. Finally, we land in the dark chamber
of the skull. The object has gone completely, and knowledge has not
yet appeared. Nervous signs are the raw material of all knowledge of
the outer world according to the most decided realism. But in order
to pass beyond these signs into a knowledge of the outer world, we
must posit an interpreter who shall read back these signs into their
objective meaning. But that interpreter, again, must implicitly
contain the meaning of the universe within itself; and these signs are
really but excitations which cause the soul to unfold what is within
itself. Inasmuch as by common consent the soul communicates with the
outer world only through these signs, and never comes nearer to the
object than such signs can bring it, it follows that the principles
of interpretation must be in the mind itself, and that the resulting
construction is primarily only an expression of the mind's own nature.
All reaction is of this sort; it expresses the nature of the reacting
agent, and knowledge comes under the same head, this fact makes it
necessary for us either to admit a pre-established harmony between the
laws and nature of thought and the laws and nature of things, or else
to allow that the objects of perception, the universe as it appears,
are purely phenomenal, being but the way in which the mind reacts
against the ground of its sensations."[213]
The dualism of Object and Subject and their pre-established harmony are
what the psychologist as such must assume, whatever ulterior monistic
philosophy he may, as an individual who has the right also to be a
metaphysician, have in reserve. I hope that this general point is now
made clear, so that we may leave it, and descend to some distinctions
of detail.
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Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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