The Principles of Psychology, Volume 1 (of 2)James, William
Philosophy
The Principles of Psychology, Volume 1 (of 2)
James, William
Psychology
But now there appears, even within the limits of the same self, and
between thoughts all of which alike have this same sense of belonging
together, a kind of jointing and separateness among the parts, of which
this statement seems to take no account. I refer to the breaks that
are produced by sudden _contrasts in the quality_ of the successive
segments of the stream of thought If the words 'chain' and 'train' had
no natural fitness in them, how came such words to be used at all? Does
not a loud explosion rend the consciousness upon which it abruptly
breaks, in twain? Does not every sudden shock, appearance of a new
object, or change in a sensation, create a real interruption, sensibly
felt as such, which cuts the conscious stream across at the moment at
which it appears? Do not such interruptions smite us every hour of our
lives, and have we the right, in their presence, still to call our
consciousness a continuous stream?
This objection is based partly on a confusion and partly on a
superficial introspective view.
The confusion is between the thoughts themselves, taken as subjective
facts, and the things of which they are aware. It is natural to make
this confusion, but easy to avoid it when once put on one's guard.
The things are discrete and discontinuous; they do pass before us in
a train or chain, making often explosive appearances and rending each
other in twain. But their comings and goings and contrasts no more
break the flow of the thought that thinks them than they break the
time and the space in which they lie. A silence may be broken by a
thunder-clap, and we may be so stunned and confused for a moment by the
shock as to give no instant account to ourselves of what has happened.
But that very confusion is a mental state, and a state that passes us
straight over from the silence to the sound. The transition between the
thought of one object and the thought of another is no more a break in
the _thought_ than a joint in a bamboo is a break in the wood. It is
a part of the _consciousness_ as much as the joint is a part of the
_bamboo_.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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