The Principles of Psychology, Volume 1 (of 2)James, William
Philosophy
The Principles of Psychology, Volume 1 (of 2)
James, William
Psychology
Let us use the words _psychic overtone, suffusion,_ or _fringe_, to
designate the influence of a faint brain-process upon our thought, as
it makes it aware of relations and objects but dimly perceived.[234]
If we then consider the _cognitive function_ of different states of
mind, we may feel assured that the difference between those that are
mere 'acquaintance,' and those that are 'knowledges-_about_' (see p.
221) is reducible almost entirely to the absence or presence of psychic
fringes or overtones. Knowledge _about_ a thing is knowledge of its
relations. Acquaintance with it is limitation to the bare impression
which it makes. Of most of its relations we are only aware in the
penumbral nascent way of a 'fringe' of unarticulated affinities about
it. And, before passing to the next topic in order, I must say a little
of this sense of affinity, as itself one of the most interesting
features of the subjective stream.
In all our voluntary thinking there is some topic or subject about
which all the members of the thought revolve. Half the time this
topic is a problem, a gap we cannot yet fill with a definite picture,
word, or phrase, but which, in the manner described some time back,
influences us in an intensely active and determinate psychic way.
Whatever may be the images and phrases that pass before us, we feel
their relation to this aching gap. To fill it up is our thoughts'
destiny. Some bring us nearer to that consummation. Some the gap
negates as quite irrelevant. Each swims in a felt fringe of relations
of which the aforesaid gap is the term. Or instead of a definite gap
we may merely carry a mood of interest about with us. Then, however
vague the mood, it will still act in the same way, throwing a mantle of
felt affinity over such representations, entering the mind, as suit it,
and tingeing with the feeling of tediousness or discord all those with
which it has no concern.
Relation, then, to our topic or interest is constantly felt in the
fringe, and particularly the relation of harmony and discord, of
furtherance or hindrance of the topic. When the sense of furtherance
is there, we are 'all right;' with the sense of hindrance we are
dissatisfied and perplexed, and cast about us for other thoughts. Now
_any_ thought the quality of whose fringe lets us feel ourselves 'all
right,' is an acceptable member of our thinking, whatever kind of
thought it may otherwise be. Provided we only feel it to have a place
in the scheme of relations in which the interesting topic also lies,
that is quite sufficient to make of it a relevant and appropriate
portion of our train of ideas.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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