The Principles of Psychology, Volume 1 (of 2)James, William
Philosophy
The Principles of Psychology, Volume 1 (of 2)
James, William
Psychology
_recognition_ without recalling the sound of its neighing or its
tramp, its qualities as an animal of draught, and so forth."[241]
It need only be added that as the Algebrist, though the sequence of his
terms is fixed by their relations rather than by their several values,
must give a real value to the _final_ one he reaches; so the thinker
in words must let his concluding word or phrase be translated into its
full sensible-image-value, under penalty of the thought being left
unrealized and pale.
This is all I have to say about the sensible continuity and unity of
our thought as contrasted with the apparent discreteness of the words,
images, and other means by which it seems to be carried on. Between all
their substantive elements there is 'transitive' consciousness, and the
words and images are 'fringed,' and not as discrete as to a careless
view they seem. Let us advance now to the next head in our description
of Thought's stream.
4. _Human thought appears to deal with objects independent of itself;
that is, it is cognitive, or possesses the function of knowing._
For Absolute Idealism, the infinite Thought and its objects are one.
The Objects are, through being thought; the eternal Mind is, through
thinking them. Were a human thought alone in the world there would be
no reason for any other assumption regarding it. Whatever it might
have before it would be its vision, would be there, in _its_ 'there,'
or then, in _its_ 'then'; and the question would never arise whether
an extra-mental duplicate of it existed or not. The reason why we all
believe that the objects of our thoughts have a duplicate existence
outside, is that there are _many_ human thoughts, each with the _same_
objects, as we cannot help supposing. The judgment that _my_ thought
has the same object as _his_ thought is what makes the psychologist
call my thought cognitive of an outer reality. The judgment that my own
past thought and my own present thought are of the same object is what
makes _me_ take the object out of either and project it by a sort of
triangulation into an independent position, from which it may _appear_
to both. _Sameness_ in a multiplicity of objective appearances is
thus the basis of our belief in realities outside of thought.[242] In
Chapter XII we shall have to take up the judgment of sameness again.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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