The Principles of Psychology, Volume 2 (of 2)James, William
Science
The Principles of Psychology, Volume 2 (of 2)
James, William
Psychology
I will answer these questions by asking another: Why do we move our
joints at all? Surely to gain something more valuable than the insipid
joint-feelings themselves. And these more interesting feelings are in
the main produced upon the _skin_ of the moving part, or of some other
part over which it passes, or upon the eye. With movements of the
fingers we explore the configuration of all real objects with which
we have to deal, our own body as well as foreign things. Nothing
that interests us is located in the joint; everything that interests
us either _is_ some part of our skin, or is something that we see as
we handle it. The cutaneously felt and the seen extents come thus to
figure as the important things for us to concern ourselves with. Every
time the joint moves, even though we neither see, nor feel cutaneously,
the reminiscence of skin-events and sights which formerly coincided
with that extent of movement, ideally awaken as the movement's import,
and the mind drops the present sign to attend to the import alone. The
joint-sensation itself, as such, does not disappear in the process. A
little attention easily detects it, with all its fine peculiarities,
hidden beneath its vaster suggestions; so that really the mind has
two space-perceptions before it, congruent in form but different in
scale and place, either of which exclusively it may notice, or both at
once,--the joint-space which it _feels_ and the real space which it
_means_.
The joint-spaces serve so admirably as signs because of their capacity
for _parallel variation_ to all the peculiarities of external motion.
There is not a direction in the real world nor a ratio of distance
which cannot be matched by some direction or extent of joint-rotation.
Joint-feelings, like all feelings, are roomy. Specific ones are
contrasted _inter se_ as different directions are contrasted within
the same extent. If I extend my arm straight out at the shoulder, the
rotation of the shoulder-joint will give me one feeling of movement;
if then I sweep the arm forward, the same joint will give me another
feeling of movement. Both these movements are felt to happen in space,
and differ in specific quality. Why shall not the specificness of the
quality just consist in the feeling of a peculiar _direction?_[194] Why
may not the several joint-feelings _be_ so many perceptions of movement
in so many different directions? That we cannot explain why they
_should_ is no presumption that they _do_ not, for we never can explain
why any sense-organ should awaken the sensation it does.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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