The Principles of Psychology, Volume 2 (of 2)James, William
Science
The Principles of Psychology, Volume 2 (of 2)
James, William
Psychology
Almost any form in oblique vision may be thus a derivative of almost
any other in 'primary' vision; and we must learn, when we get one of
the former appearances, to translate it into the appropriate one of
the latter class; we must learn of what optical 'reality' it is one
of the optical signs. Having learned this, we do but obey that law
of economy or simplification which dominates our whole psychic life,
when we attend exclusively to the 'reality' and ignore as much as our
consciousness will let us the 'sign' by which we came to apprehend it.
The signs of each probable real thing being multiple and the thing
itself one and fixed, we gain the same mental relief by abandoning the
former for the latter that we do when we abandon mental images, with
all their fluctuating characters, for the definite and unchangeable
_names_ which they suggest. The selection of the several 'normal'
appearances from out of the jungle of our optical experiences, to
serve as the real sights of which we shall think, is psychologically a
parallel phenomenon to the habit of thinking in words, and has a like
use. Both are substitutions of terms few and fixed for terms manifold
and vague.
_Sensations which we Ignore._
This service of sensations as mere signs, to be ignored when they have
evoked the other sensations which are their significates, was noticed
first by Berkeley and remarked in many passages, as the following:
"Signs, being little considered in themselves, or for their own sake,
but only in their relative capacity and for the sake of those things
whereof they are signs, it comes to pass that the mind overlooks them,
so as to carry its attention immediately on to the things signified ...
which in truth and strictness are not _seen_, but only _suggested_ and
_apprehended_ by means of the proper objects of sight which alone are
seen." (Divine Visual Language, § 12.)
Berkeley of course erred in supposing that the thing suggested was not
even _originally_ an object of sight, as the sign now is which calls it
up. Reid expressed Berkeley's principle in yet clearer language:
"The visible appearances of objects are intended by nature only as
signs or indications, and the mind passes instantly to the things
signified, without making the least reflection upon the sign, or even
perceiving that there is any such thing.... The mind has acquired a
confirmed and inveterate habit of inattention to them (the signs). For
they no sooner appear than, quick as lightning, the thing signified
succeeds and engrosses all our regard. They have no name in language;
and although we are conscious of them when they pass through the mind,
yet their passage is so quick and so familiar that it is absolutely
unheeded; nor do they leave any footsteps of themselves, either in the
memory or imagination." (Inquiry, chap. v. §§ 2, 3.)
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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