[279] In fact, to borrow a simile from Prof. G. E. Müller (Theorie der sinnl. Aufmerksamkeit, p. 38), the various senses bear in the Helmholtzian philosophy of perception the same relation to the 'object' perceived by their means that a troop of jolly drinkers bear to the landlord's bill, when no one has any money, but each hopes that one of the rest will pay. [280] Grundtatsachen des Seelenlebens (1883), pp. 480, 591-2. Psychologische Studien (1885), p. 14. [281] Psychology, ii. p. 174. [282] _Ibid._ p. 168. [283] Senses and Intellect, 3d ed. pp. 366-75. [284] Cf. Hall and Donaldson in Mind, x. 559. [285] As other examples of the confusion, take Mr. Sully: "The _fallacious assumption_ that there can be an idea of distance in general, apart from particular distances" (Mind, iii. p. 177); and Wundt: "An indefinite localization, which waits for experience to give it its reference to real space, stands in contradiction with the very idea of localization, which means the reference to a determinate point of space" (Physiol. Psych., 1te Aufl. p. 480). [286] G. Berkeley: Essay towards a new Theory of Vision; Samuel Bailey: A Review of Berkeley's Theory of Vision (1842); J. S. Mill's Review of Bailey, in his Dissertations and Disquisitions, vol. ii; Jas. Ferrier: Review of Bailey, in 'Philosophical Remains,' vol. ii; A. Bain: Senses and Intellect, 'Intellect,' chap. i; H. Spencer: Principles of Psychology, pt. vi. chaps. xiv, xvi; J. S. Mill: Examination of Hamilton, chap. xiii (the best statement of the so-called English empiricist position); T. K. Abbott: Sight and Touch, 1861 (the first English book to go at all minutely into _facts_; Mr. Abbott maintaining retinal sensations to be originally of space in three dimensions); A. C. Fraser: Review of Abbott, in North British Review for Aug. 1864; another review in Macmillan's Magazine, Aug. 1866; J. Sully: Outlines of Psychology, chap. vi; J. Ward: Encyclop. Britannica, 9th Ed., article 'Psychology,' pp. 53-5; J. E. Walter: The Perception of Space and Matter (1879)--I may also refer to a discussion between Prof. G. Groom Robertson, Mr. J. Ward, and the present writer, in Mind, vol. xiii.--The present chapter is only the filling out with detail of an article entitled 'The Spatial Quale,' which appeared in the Journal of Speculative Philosophy for January 1879 (xiii. 64). CHAPTER XXI.[287] THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. BELIEF. Everyone knows the difference between imagining a thing and believing in its existence, between supposing a proposition and acquiescing in its truth. In the case of acquiescence or belief, the object is not only apprehended by the mind, but is held to have reality. Belief is thus the mental state or function of cognizing reality. As used in the following pages, 'Belief' will mean every degree of assurance, including the highest possible certainty and conviction.