The principles of science : $b a treatise on logic and scientific methodJevons, William Stanley
Philosophy
The principles of science : $b a treatise on logic and scientific method
Jevons, William Stanley
Logic; Science -- Methodology
We enter in this chapter upon the second great department of logical
method, that of Induction or the Inference of general from particular
truths. It cannot be said that the Inductive process is of greater
importance than the Deductive process already considered, because the
latter process is absolutely essential to the existence of the former.
Each is the complement and counterpart of the other. The principles
of thought and existence which underlie them are at the bottom the
same, just as subtraction of numbers necessarily rests upon the same
principles as addition. Induction is, in fact, the inverse operation of
deduction, and cannot be conceived to exist without the corresponding
operation, so that the question of relative importance cannot arise.
Who thinks of asking whether addition or subtraction is the more
important process in arithmetic? But at the same time much difference
in difficulty may exist between a direct and inverse operation; the
integral calculus, for instance, is infinitely more difficult than the
differential calculus of which it is the inverse. Similarly, it must
be allowed that inductive investigations are of a far higher degree of
difficulty and complexity than any questions of deduction; and it is
this fact no doubt which led some logicians, such as Francis Bacon,
Locke, and J. S. Mill, to erroneous opinions concerning the exclusive
importance of induction.
Hitherto we have been engaged in considering how from certain
conditions, laws, or identities governing the combinations of
qualities, we may deduce the nature of the combinations agreeing
with those conditions. Our work has been to unfold the results of
what is contained in any statements, and the process has been one of
*Synthesis*. The terms or combinations of which the character has been
determined have usually, though by no means always, involved more
qualities, and therefore, by the relation of extension and intension,
fewer objects than the terms in which they were described. The truths
inferred were thus usually less general than the truths from which they
were inferred.
In induction all is inverted. The truths to be ascertained are more
general than the data from which they are drawn. The process by which
they are reached is *analytical*, and consists in separating the
complex combinations in which natural phenomena are presented to us,
and determining the relations of separate qualities. Given events
obeying certain unknown laws, we have to discover the laws obeyed.
Instead of the comparatively easy task of finding what effects will
follow from a given law, the effects are now given and the law is
required. We have to interpret the will by which the conditions of
creation were laid down.
*Induction an Inverse Operation*
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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