The principles of science : $b a treatise on logic and scientific methodJevons, William Stanley
Philosophy
The principles of science : $b a treatise on logic and scientific method
Jevons, William Stanley
Logic; Science -- Methodology
Certain recent logicians have proposed to avoid the indefiniteness
in question by what is called the Quantification of the Predicate,
and they have generally used the little word *some* to show that only
a part of the predicate is identical with the subject. *Some* is an
*indeterminate adjective*; it implies unknown qualities by which we
might select the part in question if the qualities were known, but
it gives no hint as to their nature. I might make use of such an
indeterminate sign to express partial identities in this work. Thus,
taking the special symbol V = Some, the general form of a partial
identity would be A = VB, and in Boole’s Logic expressions of the
kind were much used. But I believe that indeterminate symbols only
introduce complexity, and destroy the beauty and simple universality
of the system which may be created without their use. A vague word
like *some* is only used in ordinary language by *ellipsis*, and to
avoid the trouble of attaining accuracy. We can always employ more
definite expressions if we like; but when once the indefinite *some* is
introduced we cannot replace it by the special description. We do not
know whether *some* colour is red, yellow, blue, or what it is; but on
the other hand *red* colour is certainly *some* colour.
Throughout this system of logic I shall dispense with such indefinite
expressions; and this can readily be done by substituting one of the
other terms. To express the proposition “All A’s are some B’s” I shall
not use the form A = VB, but
A = AB.
This formula states that the class A is identical with the class AB;
and as the latter must be a part at least of the class B, it implies
the inclusion of the class A in that of B. We might represent our
former example thus,
Mammalia = Mammalian vertebrata.
This proposition asserts identity between a part (or it may be the
whole) of the vertebrata and the mammalia. If it is asked What part?
the proposition affords no answer, except that it is the part which is
mammalian; but the assertion “mammalia = some vertebrata” tells us no
more.
It is quite likely that some readers will think this mode of
representing the universal affirmative proposition artificial and
complicated. I will not undertake to convince them of the opposite
at this point of my exposition. Justification for it will be found,
not so much in the immediate treatment of this proposition, as in the
general harmony which it will enable us to disclose between all parts
of reasoning. I have no doubt that this is the critical difficulty in
the relation of logical to other forms of reasoning. Grant this mode of
denoting that “all A’s are B’s,” and I fear no further difficulties;
refuse it, and we find want of analogy and endless anomaly in every
direction. It is on general grounds that I hope to show overwhelming
reasons for seeking to reduce every kind of proposition to the form of
an identity.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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