History, Modern -- 19th century; Nineteenth century
Scharnhorst was the Prussian officer who began to reduce the
Napoleonic military system to rules applicable to the use of German
armies. Under Bonaparte the whole management of the army was too
often concentrated in the hands of the man of genius, and the actual
method of Napoleon had the defect that, failing the man of genius
at the head of the army, it broke down. The main change made by the
Germans, who followed Scharnhorst, in the course of the century has
been to codify the Napoleonic system so that it was possible to more
generally decentralize in practice without impairing its essence. They
have also established a division of its supply department (under a
Minister of War) from the “brain of the army,” as Mr. Spenser Wilkinson
has well called it, which manages the preparation for the strategy
of war and the strategy itself. These so-called Prussian principles
of decentralization and “initiative” are, however, not new and not
Prussian, and may be discovered in the conversations of Napoleon
Bonaparte. The French in 1870 had forgotten his teaching, and the
Germans had retained it. It is, nevertheless, the case that the number
of men placed in the field by the military powers having increased,
the intelligent initiative of corps commanders and even of generals
commanding divisions has become the more essential. It is impossible
that the great general staff can give orders in advance which will
cover the responsibility of all the inferior generals, and brains
have to be added in all ranks to obedience. The commander-in-chief in
the field cannot with advantage drown himself in details, and he can
only provide in his orders an outline sketch which his subordinates
in various parts of the field of operations have to fill in. The
“initiative of subordinates” is but the natural division of labor.
If I, a civilian student of military politics, rather than a military
expert, have been called upon to write upon the military progress of
the century, it must be because of a desire to bring largely into the
account the changes in military organization which on the continent
of Europe have made it permanently national, and which in the United
States made it temporarily national during the Civil War, and would
make it so again in the event of any fresh struggle on a great scale in
which the North American continent might become involved.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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