The efficiency of the reserves in France, Germany, and Austria is tested by the calling out of large portions of them every year for training, and they are found, as far as the infantry go, thoroughly competent for the work of war. The difficulties as regards cavalry are so obvious that it is becoming more and more recognized by Germany and by France that the cavalry will have to take the field as they stand in peace, and that their reserve men will have to be kept back with a view to the selection among them of those who are fit to serve as cavalry, and the relegation of the greater number to the train and other services where ability to ride and manage horses is more necessary than the smartness of a good cavalryman. France and Germany nominally look forward to the creation of two kinds of armies in time of war, one of the first line to take the field at once, and the other to guard the communications and garrison and support the fortresses, but in fact it is the intention of these powers to divide their armies into three—a field army of the first line, a field army of the second line, out of which fresh army corps will at once be created on the outbreak of war, and, thirdly, a territorial army for communications and for fortress purposes and as a last reserve. It is a portion of the French and German system that each army corps of the first line—and the same would be the case in war with the second line corps—has its separate organization of ammunition train and baggage train, and draws as largely as possible its supplies from its own territorial district. The peace strength of the great modern armies is for France and Germany about five hundred thousand men each, and the war strength between four million and five million men each. The peace strength of Russia is now over nine hundred thousand men. Of the war armies the training is not uniformly complete, but there are in Germany, France, Austria, and Roumania sufficient reserves of clothing and rifles to equip the war armies of those powers for the field.