The innate feeling of duty implies the _will_ to pursue moral conduct. This will is independent of the circum-ambient conditions. Kant in his nebulous language explains this consideration as follows:—“Our reason informs us of a law to which all our maxims are subject, as if our will had created its own natural order of things. This law, then, is in the sphere of a nature which we do not know empirically but which the freedom of the will makes possible, a nature which is supra-sensible, but which from the practical point of view we make objective, because it is created by our will in virtue of our existence as rational beings. The difference between the laws of a nature to which the will is subject and a nature subject to the will subsists in this, that in the first the objects must be the causes which determine the will, whilst in the second, the will itself causes the objects so that the causality of the will resides exclusively in pure reason, pure reason being thus practical reason” (_Critique of Practical Reason_). So far as I can follow the argument of Kant, it seems to me to imply that rational morality cannot be bound by human nature as it exists. I may perhaps interpret Kant’s thought as if he had the intuition that the moral will was capable of modifying nature by subjecting it to its own laws. On the other hand, several critics of Kant have attempted to improve his theory of morality by reconciling it with human nature as it actually exists. Vacherot,[228] for instance, has taken such an attitude in the most definite fashion. He insists that Kant “did not appreciate the capital importance of the object of the moral law. The problem which under the designation _summum bonum_ absorbed the schools of antiquity plays a minor part in the Kantian theory. Kant should have recognised that human destiny is not limited to duty but must include happiness” (p. 316).