The Prose Works of Percy Bysshe Shelley, Vol. 2 [of 2]Shelley, Percy Bysshe
General
The Prose Works of Percy Bysshe Shelley, Vol. 2 [of 2]
Shelley, Percy Bysshe
English prose literature
propensities themselves are comparatively impotent in cases where the
imagination of pleasure to be given, as well as to be received, does
not enter into the account. Let it not be objected that patriotism, and
chivalry, and sentimental love, have been the fountains of enormous
mischief. They are cited only to establish the proposition that,
according to the elementary principles of mind, man is capable of
desiring and pursuing good for its own sake.
JUSTICE.
The benevolent propensities are thus inherent in the human mind. We are
impelled to seek the happiness of others. We experience a satisfaction
in being the authors of that happiness. Everything that lives is open
to impressions of pleasure and pain. We are led by our benevolent
propensities to regard every human being indifferently with whom we
come in contact. They have preference only with respect to those
who offer themselves most obviously to our notice. Human beings are
indiscriminating and blind; they will avoid inflicting pain, though
that pain should be attended with eventual benefit; they will seek to
confer pleasure without calculating the mischief that may result. They
benefit one at the expense of many.
There is a sentiment in the human mind that regulates benevolence in
its application as a principle of action. This is the sense of justice.
Justice, as well as benevolence, is an elementary law of human nature.
It is through this principle that men are impelled to distribute any
means of pleasure which benevolence may suggest the communication of
to others, in equal portions among an equal number of applications. If
ten men are shipwrecked on a desert island, they distribute whatever
subsistence may remain to them into equal portions among themselves.
If six of them conspire to deprive the remaining four of their share,
their conduct is termed unjust.
The existence of pain has been shown to be a circumstance which the
human mind regards with dissatisfaction, and of which it desires the
cessation. It is equally according to its nature to desire that the
advantages to be enjoyed by a limited number of persons should be
enjoyed equally by all. This proposition is supported by the evidence
of indisputable facts. Tell some ungarbled tale of a number of persons
being made the victims of the enjoyments of one, and he who would
appeal in favour of any system which might produce such an evil to
the primary emotions of our nature, would have nothing to reply. Let
two persons, equally strangers, make application for some benefit in
the possession of a third to bestow, and to which he feels that they
have an equal claim. They are both sensitive beings; pleasure and pain
affect them alike.
CHAPTER II.
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