The Prose Works of William Wordsworth: For the First Time Collected, With Additions from Unpublished Manuscripts. In Three Volumes.Wordsworth, William
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The Prose Works of William Wordsworth: For the First Time Collected, With Additions from Unpublished Manuscripts. In Three Volumes.
Wordsworth, William
English literature -- 19th century
Deeming it then not to be doubted that the British government will
continue its endeavours to support its Allies; one or other of two
maxims of policy follows obviously from the painful truths which we have
been considering:--Either, first, that we should put forth to the utmost
our strength as a military power--strain it to the very last point, and
prepare (no erect mind will start at the proposition) to pour into the
Peninsula a force of two hundred thousand men or more,--and make
ourselves for a time, upon Spanish ground, principals in the contest;
or, secondly, that we should direct our attention to giving support
rather in _Things_ than in Men.
The former plan, though requiring a great effort and many sacrifices, is
(I have no doubt) practicable: its difficulties would yield to a bold
and energetic Ministry, in despite of the present constitution of
Parliament. The Militia, if they had been called upon at the beginning
of the rising in the Peninsula, would (I believe)--almost to a man--have
offered their services: so would many of the Volunteers in their
individual capacity. They would do so still. The advantages of this plan
would be--that the power, which would attend it, must (if judiciously
directed) insure unity of effort; taming down, by its dignity, the
discords which usually prevail among allied armies; and subordinating to
itself the affections of the Spanish and Portugueze by the palpable
service which it was rendering to their Country. A further encouragement
for adopting this plan he will find, who perceives that the military
power of our Enemy is not in substance so formidable, by many--many
degrees of terror, as outwardly it appears to be. The last campaign has
not been wholly without advantage: since it has proved that the French
troops are indebted, for their victories, to the imbecility of their
opponents far more than to their own discipline or courage--or even to
the skill and talents of their Generals. There is a superstition hanging
over us which the efforts of our army (not to speak of the Spaniards)
have, I hope, removed.--But their mighty numbers!--In that is a delusion
of another kind. In the former instance, year after year we imagined
things to be what they were not: and in this, by a more fatal and more
common delusion, the thought of what things really are--precludes the
thought of what in a moment they may become: the mind, overlaid by the
present, cannot lift itself to attain a glimpse of the future.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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