I maintain then that, merely from want of this intellectual courage, of courage as generals or chiefs, (for I will not speak at present of the want of other qualities equally needful upon this service,) grievous errors were committed by Sir Hew Dalrymple and his colleagues in estimating the relative state of the two armies. A precious moment, it is most probable, had been lost after the battle of Vimiera; yet still the inferiority of the enemy had been proved; they themselves had admitted it--not merely by withdrawing from the field, but by proposing terms:--monstrous terms! and how ought they to have been received? Repelled undoubtedly with scorn, as an insult. If our Generals had been men capable of taking the measure of their real strength, either as existing in their own army, or in those principles of liberty and justice which they were commissioned to defend, they must of necessity have acted in this manner;--if they had been men of common sagacity for business, they must have acted in this manner;--nay, if they had been upon a level with an ordinary bargain-maker in a Fair or a market, they could not have acted otherwise.--Strange that they should so far forget the nature of their calling! They were soldiers, and their business was to fight. Sir Arthur Wellesley had fought, and gallantly; it was not becoming his high situation, or that of his successors, to treat, that is, to beat down, to chaffer, or on their part to propose: it does not become any general at the head of a victorious army so to do.[19] [19] Those rare cases are of course excepted, in which the superiority on the one side is not only fairly to be presumed but positive--and so prominently obtrusive, that to _propose_ terms is to _inflict_ terms.