through the wall of the Alps and invaded Italy itself; from Raetia they destroyed Opitergium (Oderzo); bands from the Julian Alps invested Aquileia.[136] Defeats of individual Roman divisions must have taken place in various cases; we learn only that one of the commandants of the guard, Victorinus, fell before the enemy, and the ranks of the Roman armies were sorely thinned. [Sidenote: Pestilence.] This grave attack befell the state at a most unhappy moment. No doubt the Oriental war was ended; but in its train a pestilence had spread throughout Italy and the west, which swept men away more continuously than the war, and in more fearful measure. When the troops were concentrated, as was necessary, the victims of the pestilence were all the more numerous. As dearth always accompanies pestilence, so on this occasion there appeared with it failure of crops and famine, and severe financial distress; the taxes did not come in, and in the course of the war the emperor saw himself under the necessity of alienating by public auction the jewels of his palace. [Sidenote: Verus and Marcus.] There was lack of a fitting leader. A military and political task so extensive and so complicated could, as things stood in Rome, be undertaken by no commissioned general, but only by the ruler himself. Marcus had, with a correct and modest knowledge of his shortcomings, on ascending the throne, placed by his side with equal rights his younger adopted brother Lucius Verus, on the benevolent assumption that the jovial young man--as he was a vigorous fencer and hunter--would also grow into an able general. But the worthy emperor did not possess the sharp glance of one who knows men; the choice had proved as unfortunate as possible; the Parthian war just ended had shown the nominal general to be personally dissolute, and as an officer incapable. The joint regency of Verus was nothing but an additional calamity, which indeed was obviated by his death, that ensued not long after the outbreak of the Marcomanian war (169). Marcus, by his leanings more reflective than inclined to practical life, and not at all a soldier, nor in general a strong personality, undertook the exclusive and personal conduct of the requisite operations. He may, in doing so, have made mistakes enough in detail, and perhaps the long duration of the struggle is partly traceable to this; but the unity of supreme command, his clear insight into the object for which the war was waged, the tenacity of his statesmanly action, above all the rectitude and firmness of the man administering his difficult office with self-forgetful faithfulness, ultimately broke the dangerous assault. This was a merit all the higher, as the success was due more to character than to talent. [Sidenote: Progress of the war.]