The Provinces of the Roman Empire, from Caesar to Diocletian. v. 1Mommsen, Theodor
History
The Provinces of the Roman Empire, from Caesar to Diocletian. v. 1
Mommsen, Theodor
Roman provinces -- Administration; Rome -- History -- Empire, 30 B.C.-476 A.D.
It was a greater feat of Roman policy than that which enabled it to
become master of Gaul, that it knew how to retain the mastery, and that
Vercingetorix found no successor, although, as we see, there were not
entirely wanting men who would gladly have walked in the same path.
This result was attained by a shrewd combination of terrifying and of
winning--we may add, of sharing. The strength and the proximity of
the Rhine army was beyond question the first and the most effective
means of preserving the Gauls in the fear of their master. If this
army was maintained throughout the century at the same level, as will
be set forth in the following section, it was so probably quite as
much on account of their own subjects, as on account of neighbours
who afterwards were by no means specially formidable. That even the
temporary withdrawal of these troops imperilled the continuance of the
Roman rule, not because the Germans might then cross the Rhine, but
because the Gauls might renounce allegiance to the Romans, is shown
by the rising after Nero's death, in spite of all its weakness; after
the troops had marched off to Italy to make their general emperor, an
independent Gallic empire was proclaimed in Treves, and those soldiers
who were left were made bound to allegiance towards it. But although
this foreign rule, like every such rule, rested primarily and mainly
on superior power--on the ascendancy of compact and trained troops
over the multitude--it by no means rested on this exclusively. The art
of partition was here successfully applied. Gaul did not belong to
the Celts alone; not merely were the Iberians strongly represented in
the south, but Germanic tribes were settled in considerable numbers
on the Rhine, and were of importance still more by their conspicuous
aptitude for war, than by their number. Skilfully the government knew
how to foster and to turn to useful account the antagonism between
the Celts and the Germans on the left of the Rhine. But the policy of
amalgamation and of reconciliation operated still more powerfully.
[Sidenote: Policy of amalgamation.]
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