A single man when he is joined in marriage is different in that connection to what he was as single or to what he is in some other union, as a member, say, of a club. He has new powers and immunities, new responsibilities. He can be contrasted with _himself_ as he behaves in other connections. He may be compared and contrasted with his wife in their distinctive rôles within the union. But _as_ a member of the union he cannot be treated as antithetical to the union in which he belongs. _As_ a member of the union, his traits and acts are evidently those which he possesses in virtue of it, while those of the integrated association are what they are in virtue of his status in the union. The only reason we fail to see this, or are confused by the statement of it, is because we pass so easily from the man in one connection to the man in some other connection, to the man not as husband but as business man, scientific investigator, church-member or citizen, in which connections his acts and their consequences are obviously different to those due to union in wedlock. A good example of the fact and of the current confusion as to its interpretation is found in the case of associations known as limited liability joint-stock companies. A corporation as such is an integrated collective mode of action having powers, rights, duties and immunities different from those of its singular members _in their other connections_. Its different constituents have also diverse statuses--for example, the owners of stock from the officers and directors in certain matters. If we do not bear the facts steadily in mind, it is easy--as frequently happens--to create an artificial problem. Since the corporation can do things which its individual members, _in their many relationships outside of their connections in the corporation_, cannot do, the problem is raised as to the relation of the corporate collective union to that of individuals _as such_. It is forgotten that as members of the corporation the individuals themselves are different, have different characteristics, rights and duties, than they would possess if they were not its members and different from those which they possess in other forms of conjoint behavior. But what the individuals may do legitimately _as_ members of the corporation in their respective corporate rôles, the corporation does, and vice versa. A collective unity may be taken _either_ distributively _or_ collectively, but when taken collectively it is the union of its distributive constituents, and when taken distributively, it is a distribution of and within the collectivity. It makes nonsense to set up an antithesis between the distributive phase and the collective. An individual cannot be opposed to the association of which he is an integral part nor can the association be set against its integrated members.