The Railroad Question: A historical and practical treatise on railroads, and remedies for their abusesLarrabee, William
History
The Railroad Question: A historical and practical treatise on railroads, and remedies for their abuses
Larrabee, William
Railroads; Railroads -- United States; Railroads and state -- United States
Rate skirmishing finally developed into open war in 1876, when
fourth-class rates between Chicago and the Atlantic fell as low as 16
cents per hundred. This rate, however, was eclipsed in July, 1878, when
wheat was carried from Chicago to New York for 10 cents per hundred. The
existing conditions left no doubt in the minds of those familiar with
railroad tactics that this war was simply the precursor of a gigantic
combination between the trunk lines. An unsuccessful attempt to effect
such a combination had been made before. In 1874 the managers of the
Erie, Pennsylvania and New York Central met at Saratoga for the purpose
of devising means for the suppression of competition in the trunk line
traffic. This meeting, however, known in railroad history as the
Saratoga Conference, was the first step toward the organization of a
trunk line pool, although the conference did not lead to any immediate
results, the Grand Trunk and the Baltimore and Ohio refusing to be bound
by its decision. It was certainly no easy task to devise means to bring
about an effective and permanent combination among five large through
lines with greatly conflicting interests.
So far pools had never failed to suppress competition wherever they were
organized. But in the past pools had, almost without exception, only
attempted to control rates between common points. They accomplished
their object by a division of the entire traffic or earnings from the
traffic between common points. The schedule rates remained the same for
all. But the traffic of the trunk lines brought a new factor into the
problem. Here the rival routes did not terminate at the same points. It
was contended by the Baltimore and Ohio that, whatever might be the
facilities of Baltimore for exporting agricultural products, that port
was at a disadvantage as compared with the more northern ports on
account of the longer voyage and higher ocean rates to Liverpool, and
that it could therefore not enter into a combination with the roads
leading directly to New York and Philadelphia upon equal terms, since
this would divert its legitimate share of the through business to those
ports. The Grand Trunk, on the other hand, refused to enter the
combination because, not having any direct Chicago connection, it feared
that the enforcement of pool rates would materially diminish the volume
of its business. As yet the railroad wiseacres did not seem to be equal
to the emergency, and matters drifted along in the old channel. The rate
war of 1876 gradually brought about an understanding among the
belligerents. The competing roads accepted the terms offered, and with
this a new principle entered into the science of pooling. Rates between
Chicago and Baltimore were fixed somewhat lower than those between
Chicago and Philadelphia, and in turn Philadelphia was allowed a small
advantage over New York. This concession was made to equalize the
difference in the ocean rates of the competing ports. These equalizing
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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