The decision which the Supreme Court of the United States rendered in the Granger cases in 1876, affirming the right of a State to control railroad charges for the transportation of passengers and freight wholly within the State, was a serious disappointment to railroad men, for it was the first step toward wresting from them the power to arbitrarily control the commerce of the country. Ever since that time it has been their determined purpose to bring about, if possible, a reconstruction of the Federal Supreme Court, in order to secure a reversal or modification of the Granger decision. In the case of Peik vs. Chicago, 94th U. S., 176, the Supreme Court laid down the following broad principle of law: "Where property has been clothed with the public interest, the legislature may fix a limit to that which shall in law be reasonable for its use. This limit binds the courts as well as the people. If it has been improperly fixed, the legislature, not the courts, must be appealed to for a change." In one of the Granger cases the same court used the following language: "We know that this is a power which may be abused, but that is no argument against its existence. For protection against abuses by legislatures, the people must resort to the polls." Fourteen years later, in the case of C. M. & St. P. R. Co. vs. Minn., decided in October, 1890, the same court rendered a decision so indefinite that the lawyers differed much in their opinions as to its meaning, and it appears that the members of the court who made the decision also differed in their opinions as to the meaning of the decision; for Justice Bradley said in his dissenting opinion, in which Justice Gray and Justice Lamar concurred, that the decision practically overruled Munn vs. Illinois; but the same court, in a case entitled Budd vs. New York, submitted in October, 1891, and decision rendered February 29, 1892, and opinion delivered by Justice Blatchford, in referring to the Minnesota case, after quoting the above statement from Justice Bradley, said: "But the opinion of the court did not say so, nor did it refer to Munn vs. Illinois, and we are of opinion that the decision in that case is, as will be hereafter shown, quite distinguishable from the present case." It is thus apparent that this court has adhered to the decision in Munn vs. Illinois, and to the doctrines announced in the opinion of the court in that case, and those doctrines have since been repeatedly enforced in the decisions of the courts of the States. Judge Brewer, whose zeal for the defense of corporate interests seems to amount almost to a craze, dissented. He said: "I dissent from the opinion and judgment in these cases. The main proposition upon which they rest is, in my judgment, radically unsound. It is the doctrine of Munn vs. Illinois reaffirmed. The paternal theory of government is to me odious. Justice Field and Justice Brown concur with me in this dissent."