roads would be built without having first passed the ordeal of a legal injunction, and many a prospected road, though greatly needed, would remain unbuilt because its promoters would be discouraged by the delay and cost of litigation. But while this author is perfectly willing to trust the Government with the great responsibility of prohibiting the construction of proposed roads, he is not willing to have it exercise the power to determine what are reasonable rates. He tries to sustain his objection by the following argument: "The fixing of rates upon a railroad is as delicate a process as that of determining the pulse of a sick man. They cannot be determined abstractly, or in advance of the wants of business, but must be adjusted from hour to hour to conform to its fluctuations. Five thousand men find active employment in the United States in connection with the important duty of making rates. Each case requires particular investigation and involves, in many instances, prolonged study and research. The duty requires men of marked experience and capacity. They and men like them are the silent, unseen power that moves great enterprises of every nation. In the case of railroads we may enumerate those having official positions, but the experts from whom the official heads derive information and assistance cannot be classified. They comprise a vast army of experienced and able men familiar with railway traffic and quick to respond to its requirements. Such a body of men could not be organized by a government, or, if organized, would rapidly deteriorate under conditions so unfavorable for their support and development. Whatever authority exercises the duty of fixing rates must take up the subject in the same methodical way and, acting through skilled agents, pursue its inquiries and determine its results with the same experience, minute care and _conscientious regard_ for the technical requirements of business that the railway companies observe. No government can possess the facilities for perfecting so vast and intricate an organization and at the same time render it responsive to the public good. The labor is too great and the responsibility too remote. It could not move with sufficient quickness to respond to the actual requirements of trade, and too many restrictions would necessarily govern its actions. For these and other equally important reasons governments must always be satisfied to restrict their offices in this direction."