The prevailing view of our nature, however, recognizes more in it than bone, muscle, nerve, and cellular tissue, while observational science is capable of recognizing no more than these, so that, if there be any thing more, it is quite beyond the range of physical science, and within the territory of mental philosophy. Here then, is preparation for conflict, which may be accepted as inevitable, because of the advance of science. The occasion for this expectation should, however, be fully understood. Its certainty may be maintained on two obvious grounds. The first is concerned with the history of scientific progress. Science is pushing its way up the extended scale of existence with no exact knowledge of its own limits; knowing what its achievements have been, animated to a high degree by the vastness of the problems still before it, but knowing nothing quite definite as to its own boundaries. The aggressive force of science at such a stage must be great. On the other hand, there is a large body of settled conviction, which has swayed men and moulded society in all ages, which is an opposing force operating on that very line along which science is advancing, and which must be encountered whenever man's place in the universe becomes the subject of inquiry. This opposing conviction is not necessarily religious in type, though it is supported by the whole range of thought concerned with the supernatural. The conviction here referred to, as lying more obviously across the path on which science is travelling, is that concerned with the personality of man, with the rights and responsibilities of individuals, implying accepted conclusions on which the government, and police, and administration of affairs in every nation are based. It must, then, be clearly recognized that the conflict anticipated as inevitable is the conflict of knowledge of one order, with knowledge of a different order. It is conflict of knowledge obtained by the slow and difficult processes available to science, with knowledge possessed by all, applied in the regulation of individual and social life, and systematized in the annals of mental philosophy; or, we may more nearly describe the condition of matters by saying that the occasion of conflict is the determination of science to include all within its own area, rather than the possession of actual knowledge as to the highest order of life, for science is only seeking, and can not profess to have found, an explanation of the functions of human life, as it can profess to have done in the case of lower orders. There could, therefore, be no more mistaken representation of the pending conflict than the allegation that it is a conflict of knowledge with ignorance. To put it in the best light for science, it is the conflict of one kind of knowledge with another; but there is a nearer approach to accuracy if we say that the conflict is occasioned by the _want of verified conclusions_ within the