air (or dust) and perishes' (_ib._) 8; and further: 'only they that commit sin perish' (not their ancestors). The animus of this whole passage is apparent. The law-maker has to contend with them that would reject the necessity of following in order the traditional stadia of a priest's life; that imagine that by becoming ascetics without first having passed through the preliminary stadia they can by knowledge alone attain the bliss that is obtained by union with _brahma_ (or Brahm[=a]). In other words the jurist has to contend with a trait eminently anti-Brahmanistic, even Buddhistic. He denies this value of knowledge, and therewith shows that what he wishes to have inculcated is a belief in the temporary personal existence of the Manes; in heaven till the end of the world-order; and the annihilation of the wicked; while he has a confused or mixed opinion in regard to one's own personal immortality, believing on the one hand that there is a future existence in heaven with the gods, and on the other (rather a materialistic view) that immortality is nothing but continued existence in the person of one's descendants, who are virtually one's self in another body: _dehatvam ev[=a]'nyat,_ "only the body is different" (_ib_) 2. As to cosmogony it is stated to be (not the emanation of an _[=a]tm[=a]_) but the "emission (creation) of the Father-god and of the seers" (the latter being visible as stars, _ib_. 13, 14). In this there is plainly a received popular opinion, which reflects the Vedic and Brahmanic stage, and is opposed to the philosophical views of the Upanishads, in other words of the first Vedantic philosophy; while it is mixed up with the late doctrine of the cataclysms, which ruin each succeeding^ creation. The equal annihilation of the wicked (_dhvamsanti_) and unorthodox (_dhvamsate_) is to be noticed. They are here subject neither to hell nor to rebirth, but they "become dust and perish" (_ib_. 8. 9).