XXXIII. S. I come now to the third kind, that in which some inconsistency will perhaps be perceived, where all things are said to be done by the people, and to be in the power of the people. When the multitude orders punishments to be inflicted in any manner that it pleases, ordering, seizing, keeping, dissipating every thing whatever they choose, can you then Lælius, deny that to be a republic, where all things belong to the people, and when indeed we define a republic to be a commonwealth?” “There is nothing,” said Lælius, “I would sooner deny to be a republic, than where all things are in the power of the multitude. We did not consider that they had a republic among the Syracusans, or at Agrigentum, or at Athens when they were under tyrants, or at Rome when under the decemvirs. Nor do I see how the name of republic is appropriate when the multitude rules. Because first, as you have happily defined it to me, Scipio, a people does not exist, but where it is held together by consent of law; and this sort of mob, is as much a tyrant as if it were one man. Indeed it is more mischievous, for nothing is more ferocious than the wild beast which assumes the name and form of the people. Nor is it right, when the property of maniacs is placed by law under the guardianship of kindred, that * * * [Eight pages wanting.] XXXIV. * * * of it,[24] it may with as much propriety be said that it is a republic and a commonwealth, as it may be said of a kingdom. “And much more,” said Mummius, “for a king being one, is more like a master; but where many good men are at the head of affairs in a republic, nothing can be more happily constituted. But I certainly prefer a kingdom to the sway of a democracy; which third and most vicious kind of government remains for you to explain.” XXXV. To this Scipio replied, “I recognize well Spurius, your steady aversion to the popular mode, and although it might be treated with less aversion than you are wont to do, nevertheless I agree, that of all these three kinds, no one is less to be approved of. I do not however agree with you that the better class are to be preferred to a king; for if it is wisdom which governs a state, of what consequence is it, whether it resides in one, or in many? But in our discussion we are led into a sort of error. When we call them the better class, nothing can be conceived more excellent, for what can be imagined more desirable than the best? When however a king is mentioned, an unjust king occurs to our minds. We do not nevertheless intend to speak of an unjust king, in our examination of this royal kind of government. Think of Romulus, Pompilius, and Tullus as kings, and perhaps you will not be so displeased with that kind of government. M. What sort of praise then is left for a democratic government? S. What did you think, Spurius, of the Rhodians, with whom we were together; did you see nothing like a commonwealth there?